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WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL? 
By RALPH M. BATEMAN 
President, Confederation of British Industry 
British firms have always been to the fore in foreign in-
vestment in the USA. T h e book value of U K direct in-
vestments is around S51/a bi l l ion, greater than those 
of any other s ingle country, and this f igure is under-
stated. W h a t does it consist of? General manufacturing 
n ow accounts for about half the total value of all foreign 
d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t s in t h e 
S l a t e s , w h i l e p e t r o l e u m has 
d is lodged insurance and other 
financial areas from second 
place. British figures mirror this 
trend. 
A n ambivalence has crept 
into official and Congress ional 
attitudes toward foreign in-
vestments, however. Misgiv-
ings have been demonstrated 
by a rash of bills drafted by 
Ralph Rate/van C o n g r e s s m e n . T h e s e r a n g e 
from demands that restrictions should be placed upon the 
fore ign-owned portion of a US company 's vot ing stock 
to proposals for a comprehens ive government study of 
foreign investment in the US. 
T h e reasons for these misgivings are undoubtedly as-
sociated with the g r o w i n g attractiveness of investments 
in the US on cost grounds and low company price-earn-
ings ratios. The emergence of the Japanese as an ex-
porter of capital and the possibil ity of major acquis it ions 
by Middle East oil p roduc ing countries have exacerbated 
these feelings. US firms have felt themselves vulnerable, 
w h i c h added to the disquiet. 
My o w n belief is that this disquiet marks a rather be-
lated movement by the US into l ine with other countries 
concerned about the spreading inf luence of multinational 
corporat ions in their territories. I do not anticipate any 
serious general constraints. There is a basic conf l ict be-
tween tight restrictions on foreign investment here and the 
need to foster the larger overseas interests of US business. 
But the uncertainties do perplex (he foreign investor. 
Off ic ial US pol icy is to regard foreign direct investment 
as valuable and desirable, and there are virtually no laws 
w h i c h are designed or enforced that discr iminate against 
foreign investment. Taken together, however, the laws 
and regulations w h i c h do exist—however non-discr imina-
tory—form a web in which foreign businessmen can be-
c o m e so entangled as to inhibit their investing here. 
By PETER A. WAHL 
Paris representative, J, Henry Schroder & Co. 
I think it fair to say that (he great majority of European 
corporat ions suffer serious inhibit ions w h e n it comes to 
investing in the US. This may seem somewhat r idiculous, 
yet the fact remains that the v o l u m e and diversity of the 
US market, the reputation Amer ican corporations now 
have for size, organizat ion, and competit iveness, disturbs 
m a n y i n e x p e r i e n c e d E u r o -
peans, w h o have the s inking 
feeling that they w o u l d meet 
all sorts of problems in con-
troll ing their US subsidiary. 
However , many foreigners 
bel ieve that the US is one of 
the last remaining bastions of 
capital ism, and that in these 
times of c o m m o d i t y shortages, 
two commodit ies should never 
be in short supply. I refer to re-
Peter Wahl sponsibi l ity and conf idence. 
At the end of 1973, long-term Amer ican direct invest-
ments abroad were estimated to be roughly $120 bi l l ion, 
and foreign direct investment in the US $17.7 bi l l ion, I 
think it fairly obvious that existing foreign investments in 
the US can hardly be cons idered a threat—neither due to 
their s ize, nor to any concentrat ion in any industry. 
W h a t of the future behavior of foreign investors in 
the States? It is fair to say that investments wi l l increase, 
steadily if not spectacularly. I can think of three reasons 
w h y Europeans are attracted to the US. First, the dollar, 
a l though not cheap, still appears undervalued. Second, 
the prices asked for holdings in US corporations appear 
reasonable now, and it is easier to obtain the informa-
tion one needs. A n d third, European companies are fed 
up with the so-cal led stop-and-go tactics of their o w n 
authorities, w h i c h m a d e forward planning hazardous. 
Apart from a theoretical threat from the Middle East, 
foreign direct investment here is a posit ive thing. Whether 
starting from scratch or buying existing companies , for-
eigners contribute cash and technical expertise, create 
employment, and reduce savings requirements. In Europe, 
where the Amer ican contribution was only grudgingly ac-
cepted, this was of immense value. Just as Amer ican c o m -
panies abroad are meticulous in being law-abid ing and 
constructive members of their community , there is no 
reason to believe that foreigners in the US wil l not behave 
in an equal ly responsible manner. 
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O n October 21, '\974, the New York Of f ice conducted an 
educational symposium for investment bankers. Four renowned 
panelists offered insights on how foreign capital looks at investing 
in the United States. Excerpts from their discussion appear below. 
By ANTHONY ASSEILY 
Managing Director, J. Henry Schroder & Co. , Beirut 
It is estimated that M i d d l e Eastern oil revenues in 1974 
wi l l be between $65 and $75 bi l l ion, up from $'14 bi l l ion 
in 1973. This dollar increase is from a 13 percent increase 
In product ion. It is expected that a large part of these 
revenues wi l l remain unspent, and the estimates of the 
accumulated surplus by 1980 range from $200 b i l l ion 
to $600 bi l l ion. 
Apart from Kuwait , none of 
the surplus oil countries has 
t h e f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
needed to channel these funds. 
T h e y were caught unprepared 
in the same w a y consuming 
nations were—but on the other 
side of the fence. So they are 
not quite sure themselves how 
they ought to invest their sur-
plus, and one ought to analyze 
Anthony Asseiiy what they are l ikely to want to 
do with it after they have met the needs of the Arab wor ld 
and of deve lop ing countries. 
W e should understand that oil is a deplet ing asset; it 
is not replaceable. These countries are produc ing more 
oil than they need for themselves, because oil is required 
by the world's industry. So it is essential to them that in-
come-generat ing assets are acquired to replace the rev-
enue that they wi l l not get w h e n the oi l is depleted. 
Their investment pol icy can take many forms. (1) In-
vestment in safe, low-y ie ld ing but capital growth situa-
tions w h i c h w o u l d protect the fund holder against money 
erosion through inflation. Real estate might be suitable 
for this. (2) A downstream investment in the oi l industry. 
But given the l imited life of oi l wells, it makes sense 
for surplus countries to diversify their sources of in-
come. (3) Investment in other industries that w o u l d be 
of help in their domest ic economies. If an assembly 
plant of trucks or tractors exists, for example, there is a 
preference to invest in those firms that supply parts or 
accessories for those plants. This argument seems to have 
inf luenced the Iranians in buying into Krupp in Germany. 
But oil c o n s u m i n g countries cannot advocate such re-
cyc l ing of oi l revenues, and then stop it or put unac-
ceptable condit ions in its way. And, if they refuse to meet 
oil producers on this issue of investment, they cannot 
expect producers to indulge the oil consumers' prefer-
ence that producers sell their oil rather than conserve it. 
By HITOSHI TANAKA 
Senior Vice President, Yamaichi International (America) 
Japanese direct investment in the United States has be-
c o m e active only since 1972. Before that time it repre-
sented only one to two percent of the total outstanding 
investment in the US. In contrast, new investment from 
Japan dur ing 1972 was the biggest among ail countries 
with $109 mil l ion, j u m p i n g from $19 mi l l ion in 1971. 
Until recently, most invest-
ment from Japan took the form 
of c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n by 
Japanese corporat ions to US 
subsidiaries primari ly engaged 
in sales and other services. T o -
day, acquir ing US companies , 
establishing joint ventures with 
Amer ican partners, and bui ld-
ing manufactur ing plants, are 
increasingly popular. 
The out look of investment 
Hitoshi Tanaka from Japan wi l l be inf luenced 
by the problems Japan faces today. First, there is a shortage 
of natural resources: petroleum, coal , i ron ore, pulp, 
and lumber. So Japanese industry is b e c o m i n g an active 
investor in countries w h i c h produce the natural resources 
it needs. Second, real estate prices and the pol lut ion 
problem are so serious that Japanese companies are 
seeking to expand in other nations, and the US certainly 
seems to have abundant land. Third, labor costs in Japan 
by 1980 may wel l pass those of the United K i n g d o m 
and Germany and c o m e close to the US, mak ing abun-
dant and experienced A m e r i c a n labor more attractive. 
Fourth, the growing sentiment of protect ionism against 
imported goods may prompt Japanese companies to es-
tablish themselves in countries where their market is, 
Fifth, iong-term capital is lacking in Japan, and the US 
offers an excel lent f inancing market for expanding over-
seas business of Japanese companies. 
Japanese customs do create problems with mergers or 
acquisit ions, however, because to sell your c o m p a n y in 
Japan is not taken purely as a matter of business and 
economy, but rather as defeat and failure. In order to 
promote direct Japanese investment, therefore, particu-
larly their acquis it ion of existing companies , you have 
to f ind an object ive for a Japanese company. Rather than 
wait for them to c o m e to you, you have to go to them and 
propose a concrete idea, and fol low up closely and 
patiently so that they understand the objective. 
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